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Abstract. According to Nietzsche, an autonomous individual has a certain skill or 
capacity to be free, his own long, unbreakable will to power, the ability to make a 
promise, he has “mastery over himself”, has a standard of value, is permitted to say 
“yes” to himself and is conscious of “superiority and completion.” The capability to 
achieve autonomy Nietzsche explains through mastery over circumstances, nature and 
fate. Someone who has the spirit to become free is capable of accepting and affirming 
oneself as a whole, and rather than seeing the necessity or accepting the fate of one’s 
character as an obstacle to action, one sees it as an opportunity for true self-
expression. An autonomous individual is strong enough for this freedom and stands in 
the midst of a universe of joyful and trusting fatalism. This person has in his power 
conscious and unconscious drives and accepts with challenge the obstacles and 
opportunities given to him by fate. They have the will and power for struggle to 
overcome them and to achieve new freedom according to their rules and values. 
Key words: Nietzsche, autonomy, freedom, amor fati, self-overcoming. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Nietzsche does not speak often of autonomy, but this topic is deeply important to his 
philosophical project of revaluating all values. Nietzsche alludes repeatedly to the great 
obstacle caused by a slave morality which keeps us in an enslaved position enabling us to 
achieve the freedom necessary to create ourselves. The capability to achieve autonomy 
Nietzsche explains in mastery over circumstances, nature and fate. Nietzsche’s ultimate 
philosophical purpose lies in forging individuals who set values or affirm themselves. 
According to Nietzsche, subjectivity is conditioned by historical, social, psychological, 
and even biological factors. The concept of the “individual” is false. To achieve autonomy, 
an individual must be prepared to overcome the psychology of the unconscious or to try to 
                                                          
 Received July 03, 2014 / Accepted July 12, 2014 
Corresponding author: Vesna Stanković Pejnović 
Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade, Svetozara Markovića 36, Serbia 
E-mail: vesna.stankovic.pejnovic@gmail.com 
28 V. STANKOVIĆ PEJNOVIĆ 
establish a balance between conceptually structured mental states (beliefs, thoughts, 
desires, feelings) and unconscious drives, impulses, sensations (Nietzsche 1997c, ph. 
109–117).1 Nietzsche’s ethics of autonomy require that each individual determine for 
himself the kind of being that he wills to become. He is primarily interested in what we 
need to say about the psyche to understand what happens when we act on the basis of any 
value claim or express a commitment to a value. The self is not a constant, stable identity. 
On the contrary, it is something one becomes, something one constructs. Nietzsche’s 
contribution to the self-understanding of modernity is an attempt to conceive of 
autonomy in terms of the psychological naturalistic account of subjectivity. 
2. MASTERY OVER THE CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS 
“Life” reveals Zarathustra its “secret” – “I am that which must always overcome itself” 
(Nietzsche 1966, 115). The greatest obstacle to self-overcoming is thus not to be found in 
others. The self is the greatest obstacle to future overcoming. For Nietzsche life is a dark, 
driving, insatiably self-desiring power or estimating, preferring, unjust, limited, wanting 
to be different (Nietsche 1967, ph. 9). Nietzsche’s theory of the self has been already 
present, as potential, as not only a possibility but something of an obligation. It presents 
itself as an ethics, a series of “oughts”, but in everyone’s case individually determined. 
Nietzsche connected the will to power and self-overcoming because he sometimes 
concedes that the most essential element in a contestation over power has to be an 
interpretative question of what counts as having achieved mastery. All the events in an 
organic world are a subduing, a becoming of a master, and all subduing and becoming of 
a master involves a fresh interpretation, an adaptation through which any previous 
“meaning” and “purpose” are necessarily obscured or even obliterated (Nietzsche 1998, 
II, ph. 12). The world of which we can become conscious is only a surface and a sign 
world of (Nietzsche 1974, ph. 354) because the “true word” is an “unformulable world of 
chaos of sensations, unknowable to us (Nietzsche 1968b, ph. 569). 
 The base of our unconscious can be found in our shared biological and cultural 
heritage. Consciousness is not self-supporting or self-maintaining because our intellect is 
only the blind instrument of another drive which is the rival of the drive whose 
vehemence is tormenting us (Nietzsche 1974, ph. 311). If Nietzsche believes that thinking, 
feeling, and willing do not require consciousness, he does not understand “consciousness” 
as synonymous with awareness in general. For him, consciousness is a common, but 
nevertheless special, sort of awareness which has developed under the pressure of the need 
to communicate, which takes the form of words (Nietzsche 1974, ph. 354).  
Consciousness is the latest development of the organic and hence it’s the most 
unfinished and unrobust feature (Nietzsche 1998, II, ph. 37). We refer to ourselves as “I” 
(Ich), and we identify with this “I” or “ego.” But we are far more than we think we are. 
The conception of I is an illusion and fiction. “If I have anything of a unity within me, it 
certainly does not lie in the conscious “I” but somewhere else… of which my conscious 
self is but a tool (Nietzsche 2003, ph. 2). After Nietzsche had declared that we do not 
know ourselves because we have never sought ourselves, he quotes a passage from 
Matthew’s gospel: “Where your treasure is, there will your heart also be” (Nietzsche 
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1998, preface, I, ph. 3). Because of this, Nietzsche insists on the incompleteness of our 
knowledge of drives and affects and the “primeval delusion which still lives on that one 
knows of how human action is brought about” (Nietzsche 1974, ph. 311). To have a 
conscience is to be able to hear a voice within oneself. The man who belongs to the mass 
needs only to cease being comfortable with himself. Because of this, Nietzsche is 
addressing the person who can become uncomfortable with himself. 
The human being is constituted by an unknowable totality of drives, but still, we 
understand ourselves as coherent unites not as a collection of drives. These drives, 
Nietzsche implies, effects interpreted us, because drives constitute our interpretation of 
the world. If the structure is sufficiently coherent, the conflict between drives can be 
sublimated or repressed. “In every act of willing there is a plurality of feeling. There is 
some sort of biological drive behind the creation of social rules for that process, but it is 
not possible to imagine a language of need and drive employed in an address to another 
within which Nietzsche has called the context of life. Nietzsche is trying to explore what 
really lay hidden under appearances. The human in Zarathustra’s words, means “the 
esteemer.” What had once seemed known, or worthy of belief, now seems a “lie”, 
“unworthy of belief.” 
The will is not just a complex of feeling and thinking; rather it is fundamentally an 
effect; a special effect of the command. What is called “freedom of will” is essentially the 
effect of superiority with respect to something that must be obeyed: “I am free, “it” must 
obey” – this consciousness lies in every will (Nitzsche 2008, 19). “Effect” Nietzsche does 
not use in the Freudian sense of psychic energy or “charge”, but as something closer to 
feeling again. By the “effect of command“, Nietzsche means the feeling that the thought 
brings about these other bodily feelings, or “away from”, “toward” or, in a word, movement; 
and that this commanding is who I am (Leiter 2009, 109).  
If we decide to achieve autonomy, we must see ourselves in terms of multiple 
subjectivities, which is dually conditioned; by determining structures both made and not 
given, but on the other hand, not simply the consequence of conscious intentions. Nietzsche 
considers this state of being an achievement, rather than the exercise of an inherent 
capacity. The achieved state in question requires an unusual intentional self-relation, in 
particular an intentional relation to one’s own commitments. The true realization of the will 
to power has nothing to do with gaining and holding power as traditionally understood, 
except as an indifference to power in this sense (Pippin 2009, 86). But, Nietzsche points 
out, “it is just as absurd to ask strength not to express itself as strength, not to be a desire 
to overcome, crush, and become a master, to be thirsty for enemies, resistance and triumphs” 
(Nietzsche 1998, I, ph. 13).  
Nietzsche insists that is exceedingly difficult because of societal and psychological 
forces which prevent the formation of individuality, and after that autonomy. In this way, 
the “soul” is merely the name for a collective historical achievement, a mode of self-
understanding or what we have done ourselves into at one point or another in some ideal 
or other. The soul is an ideal, usually something like psychic health (Pippin 2009, 3).  
Nietzsche is convinced that individuals are regarded as a threat to social cohesion, 
primarily due to herd morality. Our society is almost ruled by the approach “the danger of 
dangers - the individual” (Nietzsche 1997c, ph. 9) or “fear of the individual”. And finally, 
morality is one of the principal mechanisms for maintaining social cohesion in which a 
particular way of thinking about the norms and their places in human affairs is formed. 
An attack on achieving autonomy, morality presupposes the notion of fixed identity that 
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is fully transparent to consciousness. But, Nietzsche argues, there is no evidentiary basis 
for the assumption that we either have a fixed or static identity or that all psychological 
phenomena is rendered into object of consciousness. When we obey moral rules, we are 
obliged to identify oneself with social roles. Nietzsche describes the change in valuation 
with the phrase “we have to learn to think differently”, outside of the moral values of good 
and evil, egoistic and selfness, because only in this perspective we will be able to “feel 
different” (Nietzsche 1997c, ph. 103). We need a critique of moral values, for one the 
value of these values is itself to be questioned. “We shall restore to men their goodwill 
towards the actions decreed as egoistic and restore to these actions their value – we shall 
deprive them of their bad conscience (Nietzsche 1997c, ph. 148). Because of this we need 
knowledge of the conditions and circumstances out of which they have grown, under which 
they have developed and shifted. Fixed identity is grounded in false beliefs about the 
structure of subjectivity. Because of this, moralistic obsession with fixed identity tends to 
undercut techniques that would result in increased self-knowledge. The real genius of the 
slave rebellion lies in its achievement, a simple inversion of value types and in the creation 
of a new way of thinking about human beings. An autonomous individual has the capability 
of creating a subject “behind” the actual deed expressing his strength, held individually, and 
of being completely responsible for his voluntary oppression of others. Our path to 
overcome ourselves life shows as its secret (Nietzsche 1966, 89) in the historical life of 
values, the feature of having to overcome it, somehow equivalent to the claim that “life is 
the will to power.” The link between the will to power and self-overcoming appears to be 
related to the notion that willing is defined as any will to power. 
Autonomous subjectivity can be achieves only in the realm of freedom and self-
satisfaction. In Twilight of Idols and Genealogy of Morality Nietzsche clearly relates 
freedom and self-responsibility. An autonomous individual has no significant purely 
theoretical interests and is indifferent to the life-world. Autonomy is not the achievement 
of conscious “self” who contributes anything to the process, but the effect of the interplay 
of certain unconscious drives over which the conscious self does not have control. 
Nietzsche understood individualization as a sort of perfectionism, and such 
individualization is accomplished by means of constant and intense observation of oneself 
and the situations in which one finds oneself. The path toward autonomy is open to 
everyone and all have the liberty to achieve this goal, but there is a question, how many 
know we are at liberty to do so? Being a free spirit – “one who has become free” – is 
Nietzsche’s version of autonomy as self-determination. Man must overcome himself by 
seeing what he originally was. Evaluated within a moral framework, autonomy turns out 
to be evil, since self-cultivation requires some fundamental egoism. The path toward 
autonomy endorses acknowledgement and affirmation of its own subjectivity and 
naturalistic understanding of the subject understood as the structure of multiple 
unconscious drives. A drive which gives rise to activity toward knowledge is our drive 
for knowledge which transforms knowledge into a passion (Nietzsche 1997c, ph. 429). 
Our drives are not “natural” but learned and assimilated from society or the state; because 
we need reorganization and assimilation, the extraction of drives needed to transform the 
human being from an organ into an organism. Nietzsche sees multiple drives as a form of 
“agonism,“ as idea in which conflict or struggle are the natural basis of life and that this 
is replicated in social, political and cultural life. The struggle is part of the foundation of 
human life and can be reached from its achievements, but only one-seated conflict is 
acknowledged and confronted. They are hidden, not merely unnoticed, or beyond the 
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conscious control or acknowledgment, motivating but hypocritically denied. All qualities 
of a person of which he is conscious, are subject to the laws of development and entirely 
different from the unknown. According to Nietzsche, an autonomous individual is 
capable of understanding the meaning of hidden drives and of controlling them.  
 In Nietzsche’s philosophy of life, conflict, struggle, tension are essential and all-
pervasive conditions for life. Contrast, obstacle, resistance and antagonism are the sine 
qua non for the exercise of freedom. The processes of self-development and change are 
never-ending. Lust for adventure is another term for the power of a will according to how 
much resistance, pain and torture can be endured. 
With an understanding of freedom as self-determination, Nietzsche strongly opposed 
Kant, especially in the notion that it is necessary to make a sharp distinction between 
subjectivity and autonomy. The subject is only unreorganized “power” of forces with a 
tendency of becoming organized if someone is trying to become an autonomous subject, 
he must be capable of overcoming imposed organization. With the help of tradition, 
authority, education and the rule of society, all subjects are heteronomous and only with 
hard, durable work in progress can a subject have the possibility to become free. In other 
words, autonomy demands the overcoming of morality in favor of the ethics of self-
fashioning and imposing one’s own rule on himself. Unlike Kantian autonomy, which 
consists of recognizing one’s own independence from nature, Nitzschean autonomy is 
focused on having a true self-understanding. Self-knowledge is another word for self-
transformation. A sovereign individual or autonomy can be fulfilled when someone is 
capable of being “answerable to oneself, and proudly so, and having the right to say yes 
to oneself” (Nietzsche 1998, II, ph. 3). Only a free person can be engaged in a critically 
distanced reflection from our current self-understanding. Freedom means that the mainly 
instincts to delight in war and victory have gained mastery over the other instincts 
(Nietzsche 1968a, ph. 38). In other words, liberation is the maintenance of a measured 
inner antagonism through a measured external antagonism with the other. Where the 
individual sees himself as a mere instrument for the good of the community, he is free. 
An individual’s actions must be under constraint and the pressure imposed by the 
interests of the community. The individual’s actions are free from constraint or limit 
where he sees himself as an autonomous end-in-itself rather than a means. The lack of 
constraint or of obstacles acts as a constraint, an insuperable obstacle to genuine freedom. 
Freedom can only mean freedom for something. From this perspective, freedom attaches 
to deeds or work. Freedom cannot be abstracted or separated from action, from the acting 
exercise of our capacities for an agency or separated from our goals or “governing 
thoughts”. Freedom, and after that individual autonomy, can be achieved only as an 
activity, as an actual exercise of our capacities, and not as freedom of opportunity against 
the false freedom, as an absence of obstacles. The process of becoming what one is 
requires self-knowledge concerning what one is, then one’s commitment and the issue 
that arises in the practical working out of what one has committed oneself to in making 
these commitments, is of fundamental importance to this process. 
 In the figure of the sovereign individual, Nietzsche presents an image of maturity, 
articulated in terms of individuality (the individual who resembles only himself) where 
such individuality is linked to autonomy, that is, being able to impose binding norms onto 
oneself. Hatab and Acampora argue that the alignment of the sovereign individual with 
free will seems to imply a commitment to moral accountability, responsibility and 
retribution (Hatab 1995, 37; Acampora 2006).  
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Nietzsche emphasizes the positive, naturalistic concept of free will which is available 
to only a few, albeit because we must ourselves become Gods to be worthy of deed killed 
God. To become Gods is to be autonomous self-legislators who are not subservient to 
authority. An autonomous individual must express his unique approach to life in a way 
that is courageous and extraordinary. He must be agonistic and not have the 
contentedness of a being. An autonomous individual or “higher humanity” is always an 
exception to the rule, but this kind of process has to do with the cultivation and 
expression of human abilities in what Nietzsche calls “life-enhancing” ways, 
transforming the biological material and social circumstances of human life in ways that 
affect its quality and contribute further to what he see as the “creation of value.”  
3. AMOR FATI AS LOVE TOWARD SELF-CREATION 
Nietzsche accepts an ancient Homeric conception of fate which, if not benevolent, 
then at least is neither malevolent nor “indifferent”, and is the determination of our 
possibilities and our outcomes. Speaking of his own destiny in Ecce Homo, he imposes a 
very real and palpable way of thinking and feeling about one’s own life. The most 
difficult test is to recognize the inevitability of the history that has made us what we are, 
but actively to “will” it. Autonomy is achieved by embracing a kind of wholeness of 
character, acceptance of what constitutes and constrains oneself as an individual and the 
creation of one’s own values. Nietzsche’s theory of value is dualistic. First, it is post-
transcendental and post-Christian. It locates value outside the individual subject, but 
within the individual, within individual experience within subjectivity. There are no 
values without valuing or valuating beings. Secondly, and more importantly, it is focused 
on the judgment and processes by means of which an object acquires value, distribution, 
exchange and transform value. Value is not cognitive, nor the object of thought, nor the 
simple product of subjectivity. Power is primarily correlated to the value or condition of 
life. Examining life, we are able to create new value, or invent a new perspective. Nietzsche 
defends generally very old values, namely courage, honesty, courtesy, politeness (Nietzsche 
1997c, ph. 556) or courage, insight, sympathy, solitude (Nietsche 1967, ph. 284). Nietzsche 
provokes in us an image of oneself in order to prompt us to reconsider ourselves. As he has 
often pointed out, our ignorance of our own ideals may well be based on the fact that we 
quite often seek other’s virtues and not our own. He returns to ancient “heroic” ethnicity, 
which is exemplary rather than rule-governed or action-guiding. Another kind of this 
ethic is amor fati also.  
Amor fati is the formula for greatness in a human being (Nietzsche 1990, 258) or the 
“inmost nature” (Nietzsche 1990, 325). It is a salient expression of Nietzsche’s conception 
of true self-love. Amor fati broadly equates to valuing the will to self-responsibility and 
that self-love consists of valuing self-respect. Amor fati involves more than bearing what 
is necessary. Loving something entails understanding this object or person as valuable. 
Fate is bound to entail at least some suffering and unhappiness. Fate is indifferent to our 
needs or desires and we are aware that we do not control it. Amor fati is a neutral choice 
of words because Nietzsche implies that we should “learn more and more to see as 
beautiful what is necessary in things” (Nietzsche 1974, ph. 276). So, every kind of 
“imperfection” and suffering give rise to highest desirability (Nietzsche 1968b, ph. 1004) 
or Dyonisian relation to existence (Nietzsche 1968b, ph. 1041). In this way we prepare 
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ourselves to a visual and conceptual representation of a particular attitude toward life 
(Magnus 1978, 142). Nietzsche refers to amor fati which emphasizes its passive 
dimension, in a mood of fatalistic surrender to God (Nietzsche 1996, 185). From this 
point of view, amor fati is surrender. It this case, love that is not under my control, and 
not entirely determined by the perceived value of the object, would remain sensitive. 
Even if fate was perceived as a negative object, our love would per se enable us to 
overcome this negative valuation. Some authors suggest mediopassive modality in 
reinterpretations of agape as a human form of love, both active and passive (Gonda 1960, 
30-67). If we want to achieve autonomy we must present amor fati in the first person 
perspective, not as an ideal but as realized state. Namely, “what is necessary does not hurt 
me; amor fati is my inmost nature” (Nietzsche 1990, 325). Such a philosophy as I live… 
wants to cross over to a Dionysian affirmation of the world (Nietzsche 1968b, ph. 1041). 
Amor fati is not reducible to pure conceptual content: it is inseparable from the first 
person experience that is both expressive of and governs by it. An autonomous individual 
must be prepared to “patiently resist a terrible long pressure – without submitting, but 
without hope (Nietzsche 1974, ph. 33). This may open the possibility of loving fate for 
the sufferer. Accepting amor fati does not mean an end to our pain, because suffering is 
beyond our control. “Millions of young Europeans who cannot endure boredom and 
would themselves welcome a yearning to suffer in order to make their suffering reason 
for action, for deeds, because neediness is needed” (Nietzsche 1974, ph. 56, 64).  
Generally, most people response to suffering with self-pity, resignation or self-
deception. Nietzsche suggests a different attitude, courage and moral strength are a force 
for a “long war against pessimism and weariness with life” (Nietzsche 1997b, II, ph. 
212). “The ultimate, most joyous yes to life, courage, as a condition of that, an excess and 
strength” (Nietzsche 1990, 272) but also “courage, severity towards oneself, cleanliness 
towards oneself” (Nietzsche 1968b, ph. 1041) only with these qualities do we have the 
strength to distance self-pity or nihilistic resignation. In a letter Nietzsche wrote to Erwin 
Rohde, Nietzsche illustrates that wearisome pain, inner disturbance, revolution, solitude 
has endured with the joyousness of the victor and fraught with difficult new plans… and 
with the prospect of a new, more difficult and even more inwardly profound suffering 
and tragedies and with the courage to face them (Nietzsche 1996, 187).  
For those who are strong enough, pain has a spiritualizing effect. Such individuals are 
able to overcome their native averseness to it by focusing on the increased lucidity that it 
may bring. With the strength to endure pain, the autonomous individual has the capability 
to transfigure the self; “man becomes the transfiguration of existence when he learns to 
transfigure himself (Nietzsche 1968b, ph. 821). Suffering is the instrument to this kind of 
“learning” because it helps us to develop the qualities (courage, strength, lucidity) which 
allow us to overcome its adverse effect. Transfiguration of the existence is in direct 
proportion to the transformation of the self, “the tragic man affirms even the harshest 
suffering: he is sufficiently strong, rich and capable of deifying to do so” (Nietzsche 
1968b, ph. 1051). Nietzsche’s central charges against Christianity were that precisely by 
disguising suffering, through fostering resentment, it prevents suffering from being 
instrumental to the creation of a positive value (Leiter 2002, 128–34). “Morality” 
interprets suffering as the subject’s own sinfulness and actually succeeded, for a while, in 
creating the conditions of commitment, sacrifice, dedication, but it exacted far too high a 
price. Ultimately morality left us “an outpost of discontented, arrogant and nasty 
creatures” (Nietzsche 1998, III, ph. 2) and led us to nihilism.  
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The positive state of amor fati Nietzsche points out with the statement that a “powerful 
soul emerges from such hells with a greater fullness and powerfulness, and most essential 
of all, with a new increase in the blissfulness of love” (Nietzsche 1968b, ph. 352). From 
the “abysses” of suffering, one returns “newborn, more ticklish, more malicious, with 
more delicate taste for joy… more childlike and yet hundred times subtler than before” 
(Nietzsche 1974, ph. 37). When we are capable of transforming our perception, we can 
transform our whole life because “we become more attentive and do not take anything for 
granted: the smallest, most tender, most fleeting moments life give us” (Nietzsche 1997b, 
II, ph. 213). 
4. CONCLUSION 
To be autonomous means to be free, to have one’s own long, unbreakable will, the 
power to be able to make a promise, to have “mastery over himself”, to have a standard 
of value, to be permitted to say “yes” to oneself and conscious of “superiority and 
completion.” Because of this autonomy, man possesses is certain skill or capacity. The 
free man is a warrior (Nietzsche 1968a, ph. 92) and his freedom is measured by the 
resistance which has to be overcome, by the effort it cost to stay aloft. The resistance has 
to be overcome and the person must be in the process of constant overcoming. Someone 
who has a spirit to become free is capable of accepting and affirming oneself as a whole, 
and rather than seeing the necessity or accepting the fate of one’s character as an obstacle 
to action, one sees it as an opportunity for true self-expression. An autonomous individual is 
strong enough for this freedom and stands in the midst of a universe of joyful and trusting 
fatalism. An autonomous subject is someone who is conscious of the strength of 
character, creatively embraces the personality as valuable, welcomes the limitations of 
internal and external nature as a true condition of action and creation, that evaluation 
arises out of the fulfillment of the goal of becoming who he really is. Man had to learn to 
“experience a hunger and thirst for himself and to learn to “find satisfaction and fullness 
in himself”. “I want to learn more and more to see what is necessary in things as what is 
beautiful in them – thus I will be one of those who make things beautiful” (Nietzsche 
1974, ph. 276) The meaning of Prometheus’s suffering represents extensions and 
consequences of the kind of gap he opens up and holds open because he creates by his act 
and he promises to be able to explain. 
All action involves some sort of negation. Nietzsche is particularly interested in a 
kind of inward-looking self-negation, a transformation of what has been the subject’s 
restrains, or commitments, basic desires and passion because those are the preconditions 
for a new kind of outward-looking relation to the world. Acting through negating what 
there is, presumes some sort of experience in which such an absence or barrier or 
limitation becomes unacceptable; because of this, limitations must be overcome. It is the 
possibility of a passionate identification of some possible project or goal, some dedication 
to a hierarchy of what matters. 
“Self-mastery” or achieved autonomy is an effect of the interplay of certain unconscious 
drives over which the conscious self-exercise no control. The synthesis of the drives, 
under a single command, matters, especially because it is the power over the other drives. 
By unifying the drives, it constitutes out of them a self. And this self is also responsible. 
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As a positive pole, an autonomous individual refers to “the condition of self-mastery” 
or full competence to represent oneself to the rest of the world (Frankfurt 1988, 11–25). 
At the negative pole, stands the “liar who breaks his word the moment he utters it.” 
Things are the effect of their internal dynamics that at the same time have an impact 
on the world. Things are not what they merely appear to be in a rough empirical sense. 
Because of this fact, there is no necessary way in which man is to act or to be. Man is not 
reducible to one fundamental essence, because a human being is not essentially rational, 
essentially ethical or essentially social. 
An autonomous person is capable of following a new set of values, the conception of 
oneself as deciding, choosing, now being a genuine agent, a neutral subject of free will 
with unlimited possibility of action unconstrained by character and the causal order. The 
capacity for “self-overcoming” is consistent with our being, or our organic material bodies 
located in space and time or products of a combination of environmental influences, general 
and particular psycho-physiological constitutions, and interpersonal encounters, leaving no 
place for any more significant sort of self food, self-determination and responsibility for 
ourselves, our lives, and our conduct and real normativity and morality. 
Nietzsche insists that autonomy is closely connected with the process of becoming 
who one individuality is, to “be yourself” (Nietzsche 1997a, 127) or “you should become 
who you are” (Nietzsche 1974, ph. 219). Autonomy is some sort of affirmative psychological 
relation to one’s own deeds, a relation to one’s own deeds, experiencing them as genuinely 
one’s own. In short, autonomy is an achievement.  
In other words, an autonomous individual can create oneself and invent some ideal of 
social independence and a kind of self-rule or self-reliance. In this way, the achieved 
autonomy has elements both of self-realization theory (how to become what we are) and 
theory which insist that one ought to become who one is (be who you are) or these 
individuals are self-creating and individually self-created, hierarchically unified beings 
and in that sense, they reach freedom. The only emancipated individual is the master of 
free will (Nietzsche 1998, II, ph. 2) capable of becoming something other than he was by 
forgetting what he was or destroying what we have presented here (Nietzsche 1998, II, 
ph. 24). Nietzsche emphasizes the process of acting the “how” of becoming. An autonomous 
character creates oneself in a way to give style to one’s character and also establishes 
hierarchical unity among the state of one’s soul, memoires, aversion or autonomy is the 
complete and hierarchical unity among the states of one’s soul, memories, desires, 
aversion and acceptance of fate. Style, which is what Nietzsche requires and admires, 
involves controlled multiplicity and resolved conflict. The structure of style is like the 
structure of personality. The goal of this process must not be understood as some fully 
formed and completed subject of the self. The central insight is focused on the process of 
becoming what has never ended. 
For Nietzsche man must become aware of the fact that the existence of a human being 
is completely gratuitous, a contingent gift, not something like the necessary unfolding or 
the expression of a fixed and purposefully evolving nature or of divine providence. The 
image includes within itself the paradox in this way of thinking – the human being, the 
sense – the maker of suffering is a product of human beings, as the cause of itself. A 
person is necessary, a person is a piece of fate, a person belongs to the whole, because, a 
person exists only in the context of the whole. The achievement of fate is responsible for 
one’s being in such a self-relational state. Freedom of the highest sort is the true or 
pragmatic instance of independence from others and a kind of self-direction. Because of 
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this, freedom as a precondition to autonomy is achieving a capacity both to sustain a 
wholehearted commitment to an ideal and a willingness to overcome or abandon such a 
commitment in altered circumstances, or as a result of any development. 
Great men are “heroes” because they can do what we cannot. Nietzsche is aware of 
“imperious voice” within them as their “inner admonition.” We attempt to hide from our 
self the knowledge that what attracts us to the great man is “the virtue in ourselves.” 
 Nietzsche offers a new conception of autonomy, which values it as a privileged kind of 
power, achieving a new kind of self, assuming a new kind of responsibility, consciousness 
of a rare freedom, power over oneself and fate. Love of fate is an existential attitude 
which requires our participation, but which does not fully depend on us. Amor fati helps 
us to become our own redeemer and a bringer of joy. With this kind of love we can 
overcome all obstacles, vanquish death and last forever. While loving my fate does entail 
my being strong enough to love even the pain that it brings me, it does not commit me to 
the loving, suffering of others, even though there may sometimes be a direct causal link 
between the pain I feel and the suffering that I endure. Nietzsche points out that 
autonomous individual is capable of achieving a fuller power, selfhood and responsibility 
and his task is “preparing humanity’s moment of highest self-reflection, a great noon 
when it will look back and look out… and the first time pose the question of why? and 
what for? as a whole? Self-creation, or the autonomous individual is the creation of a 
“unique” human being who gives laws to oneself based on own “measure of value.” 
Value existentially depends on the existence of affective experiences and is actualized 
only in or through them. This is the explanation of notion that value is not “found” but 
“created” by evaluating (Nietzsche 1974, ph. 301) that morality is only a sign language of 
the affect (Nietsche 1967, ph. 187) and every ideal presupposes love and hatred, 
admiration and contempt. To submit to one’s taste or one’s own law is another way of 
expressing binding oneself to constraints that, at least in advance, defy all formulation 
through concepts and to affirm such constraints as the conditions of one’s agency. 
These “laws” are not explicit; symbolically they represent rules, but the ability to 
recognize what constitutes acting in accordance with it and what constitutes violating it. 
Nietzsche stresses the autonomous individual’s lack of need for certainties, explicit rules 
and imperatives, insisting that every action has been done in a unique and irreversible 
way and this will be equally true of every future action that has ever been done in a 
unique and irreversible way. There is no “being” behind doing, because the deed is 
everything. One is what one does. The Nietzschean notion of autonomy and the concept 
of freedom that goes with it have to do with coming to understand oneself. 
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NIČEOVO POIMANJE AUTONOMIJE 
KAO SAMOPREVAZILAŽENJE  
Prema Ničeovom shvatanju autonomna individua ima određene veštine ili sposobnosti za 
slobodu i svoju dugu, nepokolebljivu volju ka moći, sposobnost da održi obećanje, “vladavinu nad 
sobom”, svoju standardizaciju vrednosti, dozvola da kažu “da” i svest o “superiornosti i 
kompleksnosti”. Sposobnost ostvarenja autonomije Nietzsche objašnjava ovladavanjem nad 
okolnostima, prirodom i sudbinom. Onaj tko poseduje duh slobode, sposoban je prihvatiti i 
afirmisati sebe kao celinu te ne vide prihvatanje sudbine nečijeg karaktera kao prepreku i 
delovanju izgradnje karaktera, već kao priliku za istinsko samoostvarenje. Autonomna individu je 
dovoljno jaka za takvu vrstu slobode te se prepuštao radosnom i verujućem fatalizmu. Takva osoba 
ima u svojoj moći svesne i nesvesne instinkta i prihvata sa izazovom prepreke i mogućnosti koju su 
dobili od stane sudbine. Poseduju snagu i moć za borbu kojom se nadilaze i dostižu novu slobodu 
prema svojim pravilima i vrednostima. 
Ključne reči:  Niče, autonomija, sloboda, amor fati, nadilaženje. 
 
